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Abstract
In the context of auctions for digital goods, an interesting random sampling auction has been proposed
by Goldberg, Hartline, and Wright [2001]. This auction has been analyzed by Feige, Flaxman, Hartline,
and Kleinberg [2005], who have shown that it is 15-competitive in the worst case – which is substantially
better than the previously proven constant bounds but still far from the conjectured competitive ratio
of 4. In this paper, we prove that the aforementioned random sampling auction is indeed 4-competitive
for a large class of instances where the number of bids above (or equal to) the optimal sale price is at
least 6. We also show that it is 4.68-competitive for the small class of remaining instances thus leaving
a negligible gap between the lower and upper bound. We employ a mix of probabilistic techniques and
dynamic programming to compute these bounds.
1 Introduction
In recent years, there has been a considerable amount of work in algorithmic mechanism design. Most of
this work can be divided into two categories based on their assumption about prior: (i) Bayesian, and (ii)
prior free. Bayesian mechanism design is based on exploiting the knowledge of the prior to optimize the
expected performance, whereas prior free mechanism design is aimed at optimizing the worst case perfor-
mance. Random sampling is perhaps the most popular technique in prior free mechanism design, yet an
accurate analysis of its performance has proven difficult even in the simplest applications.
This paper focuses on analyzing the performance of the random sampling auction proposed by Goldberg
et al. [2001], known as the “Random Sampling Optimal Price (RSOP)” auction. The basic problem can be
described as follows. A seller has unlimited supply of a good (e.g., a digital good) 1 which he is going to
sell to unit demand bidders through the following auction: bids are partitioned into two sets uniformly at
random; then the optimal (revenue maximizing) sale price is computed for each set, and offered as the sale
price to the opposite set. The expected revenue of RSOP is then compared against the optimal revenue of
single price sale of at least two copies.
Most of our analysis is based on the following approach: we develop a lower bound on the performance
of RSOP that depends on the level of balancedness of the partitions, but independent of the bid values; we
then take the expectation of this lower bound over the varying level of balancedness to obtain a general
lower bound on the performance of RSOP. That is in contrast to the previous work based on showing that
a certain level of balancedness is met with a reasonable probability, which inevitably requires a tradeoff
between how strong the balancedness condition is versus how likely it holds.
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1If there is a fixed production cost per copy, the auction can still be used by simply subtracting the production cost from
every bid.
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Related work. The random sampling optimal price (RSOP) auction has been proposed by Goldberg et al.
[2001], but the problems was first studied by Goldberg and Hartline [2001]. The revenue of RSOP has been
shown to be close to optimal for many classes of interesting inputs by Segal [2003], and Balcan et al. [2005].
There has also been a fair amount of work analyzing the competitive ratio of RSOP. Goldberg and Hartline
[2001] showed that RSOP obtains a constant fraction of the optimal revenue, and conjectured the constant to
be 1/4; note that the conjecture is tight for an instance with 2 bidders with distinct bids. A better analysis
was proposed by Feige et al. [2005] which proved the constant to be at least 1/15 .
It is important to prove that RSOP is 4-competitive, because it is a natural and popular mechanism which
is easily implementable and adaptable to various settings (e.g., double auctions Baliga and Vohra [2003],
online limited-supply auctions Hajiaghayi et al. [2004], combinatorial auctions Balcan et al. [2005], Goldberg
and Hartline [2001], and other setting such as Hartline and Roughgarden [2008]). Indeed the results of this
paper have been used in analysis of other auctions such as the random sampling based auction of Devanur
and Hartline [2009] for limited and online supply.
Results. The following is a summary of our main results.
I. Improved lower bounds: We prove that the ratio of the expected revenue of RSOP to its benchmark
is:
• at least 1/4.68 (e.g., Theorem 1, and Theorem 2), improving the previous lower-bound of 1/15
due to Feige et al. [2005];
• at least 1/4, if there are at least 6 bids above (or equal to) the sale price.
• at least 1/3.52, as the number of bids above (or equal to) the sale price approaches infinity.
Our analysis suggests that the worst case performance of RSOP is attained when there are only two
bidders with distinct bids.
II. Upper bound: We show that there exist instances where the expected revenue of RSOP is still less
than 1/2.65 of its benchmark, even when the number of bids above the optimal sale price approaches
infinity.
III. Combinatorial approach: We also present a combinatorial lower bound on the performance of RSOP
for a special case when each non-zero bid can take one of only two possible values.
2 Preliminaries
We consider auctioning a digital good to n bidders whose bids are represented by the vector v = (v1, . . . , vn)
which is, without loss of generality, sorted in decreasing order.
Definition 1 (RSOP). The random sampling optimal price auction partitions the bids into two sets A and
B uniformly at random 2, computes the optimal sale price of each set, and offers it as the sale price to the
opposite set.
Definition 2 (OPT). The optimal revenue from single price sale to at least two bidders is
OPT = max
j≥2
jvj . (1)
See Goldberg et al. [2006] for motivation of the definition of OPT and why it requires selling to at least
two bidders.
2I.e., each bid independently goes to one of A or B with probability 1
2
.
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Assumptions. We assume A and B contain the indices of the bids (as opposed to the actual value
of the bids). Without loss of generality we assume there are infinitely many 0 bids, i.e., vj = 0 for all
j > n; consequently (A,B) is a partitioning of N. The previous assumption allows us to make our analysis
independent of n. Also, without loss of generality we assume 1 ∈ B. 3
Throughout most of our analysis we ignore the revenue of RSOP from bidders in A because in the
pathological case where v1 is too large (e.g., v1 > OPT), the optimal sale price for B is equal to v1 which
yields no revenue when offered to A.
Notation. We adopt the convention of using bold letters for vectors, capital roman letters for sets, capi-
tal italic letters for single-dimensional random variables, capital bold letters for multi-dimensional random
variables (such as sets or vectors), and capital calligraphy letters for events.
We will use E[RSOP] to denote the expected revenue of RSOP on an implicit bid vector v, where the
expectation is taken over all random partitions (A,B); however we sometimes specify an explicit bid vector
by writing E[RSOP(v)] or OPT(v).
We use λ to denote the index of the optimal sale price which sells to at least two bidders, i.e.,
λ ∈ arg maxj≥2 jvj (2)
For every j ∈ N, we define
Sj = |A ∩ {1 · · · j}|, (3)
Zj =
|B ∩ {1 · · · j}|
|A ∩ {1 · · · j}| =
j − Sj
Sj
, (4)
Z = min ({Zj}j∈N, 1) . (5)
Note that Sj , Zj and Z are random variables which depend only on how the bids are partitioned, but not
on the actual value of the bids.
For every T ⊂ N and α, α′ ∈ [0, 1], we define the following events:
ETα =
{
max
j∈T
Sj
j
≤ α
}
, (6)
ET(α′,α] =
{
α′ < max
j∈T
Sj
j
≤ α
}
= ETα \ ETα′ (7)
Figure 1 illustrates an example of ETα and ET(α′,α]. We omit T if T = N, i.e., Eα = ENα and E(α′,α] = EN(α′,α].
Finally, for any random variable X and event E , we use Ê[X | E ] to denote the expectation of X
conditioned on event E normalized by the probability of E , i.e.,
Ê [X |E ] = E [X | E ] Pr [E ] . (8)
We will use the following proposition extensively throughout this paper.
Proposition 1. For any random variable X and any two events E , E ′,
• if E ′ ⊆ E, then Ê[X | E \ E ′] = Ê[X | E ]− Ê[X | E ′];
• if E ∩ E ′ = ∅, then Ê[X | E ∪ E ′] = Ê[X | E ] + Ê[X | E ′]
The following lemmas will be useful throughout the rest of this paper.
Lemma 1. For any T,T′ ⊂ N and α ∈ [0, 1], the two events ETα and ET
′
α are positively correlated, i.e.,
Pr[ETα ∩ ET
′
α ] ≥ Pr[ETα ] Pr[ET
′
α ] (alternatively Pr[ETα ∩ E
T′
α ] ≤ Pr[ETα ] Pr[E
T′
α ]).
Proof. The claim follows directly from the FKG inequality and can be found in Appendix B.
3Otherwise we can swap A and B.
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Lemma 2. For any α ∈ (0, 1) and j ∈ N,
if α ≥ 0.5, then Pr
[
E{j}α
]
≥ 1− (rα)j , where rα = 1
2αα(1− α)1−α , (9)
if α ≤ 0.5− 1/j, then Pr
[
E{j}α
]
≤ (r(α+1/j))j−1 where rα is the same as above. (10)
Proof. The claim follows from a direct application of Chernoff-Hoeffding bound and can be found in Ap-
pendix B.
3 The Basic Lower Bound
In this section we prove that RSOP is indeed 4-competitive for a large class of input instances (i.e., when
λ > 10). In the next section, we improve this result for λ ≤ 10 using a more sophisticated analysis, but
based on the same ideas. The following theorem summarizes the main result of this section.
Theorem 1. E[RSOP] ≥ 14 OPT for all λ > 10. Furthermore, E[RSOP] ≥ 13.52 OPT for all λ > 5000.
Table 1 lists the actual lower bounds obtained for various choices of λ.
The outline of this section is as follows. First, we present a lower bound on E[RSOP] as a function of λ.
Recall that expectation is taken over all random partitions (A,B) for a fixed set of bids (and thus a fixed λ).
Our proposed lower bound depends only on λ and not the actual value of the bids. We present a dynamic
program for numerically computing the lower bound for any fixed λ. By computing the lower bound on
E[RSOP] for all λ ∈ {11 · · · 5000} we confirm that it is indeed greater than 14 OPT. We then prove a lower
bound of 13.52 OPT on E[RSOP] for all λ > 5000.
The following lemma provides a lower bound on E[RSOP] as a function of λ.
Lemma 3. E[RSOP] ≥ E[Sλλ Z ] OPT.
Proof. Let vλA be the optimal price for A which RSOP offers to bidders in B; observe that SλAvλA ≥ Sjvj
for all j ∈ N. The revenue of RSOP is at least the revenue it obtains from B, therefore
RSOP ≥ (λA − SλA)vλA because at least λA − SλA bids in B are above or equal to vλA
= ZλASλAvλA by definition of ZλA in (4)
≥ ZSλvλ because Z ≤ ZλA and Sλvλ ≤ SλAvλA
= Z
Sλ
λ
OPT because OPT = λvλ.
Consequently, E[RSOP] ≥ E[Sλλ Z ] OPT which proves the claim.
It is crucial that the lower bound provided by the above lemma only depends on λ and not on the exact
value of the bids. Recall that λ depends only on the value of the bids and not on how the bids are partitioned.
3.1 Small λ
We start by proving the first part of Theorem 1, i.e., that E[RSOP] ≥ 14 OPT for all 10 < λ ≤ 5000.
Recall that E[RSOP] ≥ E[Sλλ Z ] OPT by Lemma 3. Ideally, we would like to approximate E[Sλλ Z ] by
E[Sλλ ] E[Z ], however
Sλ
λ and Z are negatively correlated. To work around this obstacle we will decompose
E[Sλλ Z ] over a set of small and disjoint events such that, conditioned on each such event, Z can be approx-
imated closely by a constant. The events are defined as follows. We partition the interval [0, 1] to small
disjoint intervals by picking m points 0.5 < α1 < · · · < αm < 1. For each interval (αi−1, αi] we consider the
event E(αi−1,αi]. Recall that E(αi−1,αi] is the event that (maxj
Sj
j ) ∈ (αi−1, αi] (see Figure 1). Conditioned
on E(αi−1,αi], it is easy to see that Z ∈ [ 1−αiαi ,
1−αi−1
αi−1
), and therefore we can obtain a good lower bound by
substituting Z with 1−αiαi . Notice that there is no use in picking αi from [0, 0.5] because for any α ∈ [0, 0.5],
Pr[Eα] = 0 and therefore, for any bounded random variable X , we get Ê[X | Eα] = E[X | Eα] Pr[Eα] = 0.
Also notice that there is no use in considering the event E(αm,1] because we can only guarantee a trivial lower
bound of 0 for Z under E(αm,1].
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(a) Eα denotes the event that the points (j,Sj) lie below
the line y = αx (the gray area). This figure shows the plot
of (j,Sj) for an instance of random partitioning in which
the event Eα with α = 34 has occurred.
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(b) E(αi−1,αi] denotes the event that the point
(j,Sj) with the highest ratio of
Sj
j
lies on or
below the line y = αix and above the line y =
αi−1x. This figure shows the plot of (j,Sj) for
an instance of random partitioning in which the
event E(α2,α3] has occurred (indicated by the
dark gray region).
Figure 1
Lemma 4. Given an increasing sequence α1, . . . , αm ∈ (0.5, 1), the following inequality holds for any non-
negative random variable X .
E [XZ ] ≥
m∑
i=1
(
1
αi
− 1
αi+1
)
E
[
X
∣∣ Eαi] . (11)
Assume αm+1 = 1.
Proof. Let α0 = 0. We decompose E[XZ ] over the set of disjoint events E(α0,α1], . . . , E(αm−1,αm] as follows.
E [XZ ] ≥
m∑
i=1
Ê
[
XZ
∣∣∣ E(αi−1,αi]] by law of total expectation
≥
m∑
i=1
Ê
[
X
1− αi
αi
∣∣∣∣ E(αi−1,αi]] because Z ≥ 1− αiαi conditioned on E(αi−1,αi]
=
m∑
i=1
1− αi
αi
(
Ê
[
X
∣∣∣ Eαi]− Ê [X ∣∣∣ Eαi−1]) by Proposition 1 given that E(αi−1,αi] = Eαi \ Eαi−1
=
m∑
i=1
(
1
αi
− 1
αi+1
)
Ê
[
X
∣∣ Eαi] by rearranging the terms.
Note that in the last step we have used the fact that Ê[X | Eα0 ] = 0 (because Pr[Eα0 ] = 0).
The choice of m and α1, . . . , αm in Lemma 4 greatly affects the value of the lower bound. Generally
speaking, increasing m improves the lower bound but at the cost of more computation.
In order to use Lemma 4 effectively, we need to be able to compute E[Sλλ | Eαi ] for each αi. However
the events Eαi are hard to deal with computationally. The next two lemmas show that E[Sλλ | Eαi ] can be
bounded below and thus approximated by E[Sλλ | E{1···`}αi ] −  where  approaches 0 exponentially fast as a
function of `.
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Lemma 5. For any random variable X ∈ [0, 1], any α ∈ (0.5, 1], and ` ∈ N the following holds:
Ê
[
X
∣∣∣ Eα] ≥ Ê [X ∣∣∣ E{1···`}α ]−  where  = Pr [E{1···`}α ] (1−Pr [E{`+1···∞}α ]) (12)
Proof. Observe that Eα = E{1···`}α \ (E{1···`}α ∩ E
{`+1···∞}
α )
4, therefore
Ê
[
X
∣∣∣ Eα] = Ê [X ∣∣∣ E{1···`}α ]− Ê [X ∣∣∣ E{1···`}α ∩ E{`+1···∞}α ] by Proposition 1
≥ Ê
[
X
∣∣∣ E{1···`}α ]−Pr [E{1···`}α ∩ E{`+1···∞}α ] because X ∈ [0, 1]
≥ Ê
[
X
∣∣∣ E{1···`}α ]−Pr [E{1···`}α ] (1−Pr [E{`+1···∞}α ]) by Lemma 1
The following lemma allows us to compute an upper bound on the  of the previous lemma.
Lemma 6. For any α ∈ (0.5, 1] and any `, `′ ∈ N such that ` ≤ `′, the following holds:
Pr
[
E{`+1···∞}α
]
≥
(
1− (rα)
`′+1
1− rα
)
`′∏
j=`+1
(
1− (rα)j
)
where rα is defined in (9) (13)
Proof.
Pr
[
E{`+1···∞}α
]
= Pr
 ∞⋂
j=`+1
E{j}α
 ≥ Pr
 ∞⋂
j=`′+1
E{j}α
 `′∏
j=`+1
Pr
[
E{j}α
]
by Lemma 1
≥
1− ∞∑
j=`′+1
Pr
[
E{j}α
] `′∏
j=`+1
Pr
[
E{j}α
]
by union bound
≥
(
1− (rα)
`′+1
1− rα
)
`′∏
j=`+1
(
1− (rα)j
)
by Lemma 2
Observe that in the special case of the above lemma in which ` = `′, the right hand side of (13) approaches
1 exponentially fast as a function of ` which implies that  in (12) approaches 0 exponentially fast as a function
of `. Choosing `′ > ` only improves the bound.
The next lemma provides a recurrence relation which can be used to compute the exact value of
E[Sλλ | E{1···`}α ] and Pr[E{1···`}α ] in time O(`2).
4E{`+1···∞}α is the complement of E{`+1···∞}α .
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Lemma 7. For any ` ∈ N and α ∈ [0, 1], the exact value of Ê[Sλλ | E{1···`}α ] and Pr[E{1···`}α ] can be computed
using the following recurrence in which E{1···`}α,k = E{1···`}α ∩ {S` = k} is the event that E{1···`}α happens and
S` = k.
Pr
[
E{1···`}α,k
]
=

1
2 Pr[E{1···`−1}α,k−1 ] + 12 Pr[E{1···`−1}α,k ] ` > 1, k ≤ α`
1 ` = 1, k = 0
0 otherwise
(14)
Ê
[
Sλ
λ
∣∣∣∣ E{1···`}α,k ] =

1
2 Ê[
Sλ
λ | E{1···`−1}α,k−1 ] + 12 Ê[Sλλ | E{1···`−1}α,k ] ` > λ, k ≤ α`
k
λ Pr[E{1···`}α,k ] ` = λ
0 otherwise
(15)
Pr
[
E{1···`}α
]
=
∑`
`=0
Pr
[
E{1···`}α,k
]
(16)
Ê
[
Sλ
λ
∣∣∣∣ E{1···`}α ] = ∑`
k=0
Ê
[
Sλ
λ
∣∣∣∣ E{1···`}α,k ] (17)
Proof. Let A` denote the event that ` ∈ A. First consider (14): if ` > 1 and k ≤ α`, then E{1···`}α,k can be
decomposed as two disjoint events E{1···`−1}α,k−1 ∩A` and E{1···`−1}α,k ∩A`, therefore its probability is the sum of the
probabilities of those two event; note that E{1···`−1}α,k and A` are independent for any ` and k and Pr[A`] = 12 ;
furthermore the base of the recursion is Pr[E{1}α,0 ] = 1 because by our assumption A1 = 0 (i.e., the highest
bid is always in B). The same argument implies the correctness of (15) for the case of ` > λ. Furthermore,
E{1···λ}α,k by its definition implies Sλ = k which implies the correctness of (15) for the case of ` = λ. Finally
(16) and (17) follow trivially from the law of total probability and the law of total expectation.
Proof of Theorem 1 for small λ (i.e., 10 < λ ≤ 5000). We show how to numerically compute a lower bound
on E[RSOP] for any fixed λ. Let m = 100 and αi = 0.5 +
i
m+1 for each i ∈ [m]. Observe that
E [RSOP] ≥ E
[
Sλ
λ
Z
]
OPT by Lemma 3
≥
m∑
i=1
(
1
αi
− 1
αi+1
)
E
[
Sλ
λ
∣∣∣∣ Eαi]OPT by Lemma 4
We then compute a lower bound for each E[Sλλ | Eαi ] (using Lemma 5, Lemma 6, and Lemma 7 with ` = 5000
and `′ = 100000), and substitute them in the last inequality above to obtain a lower bound on E[RSOP].
We have confirmed that E[RSOP] ≥ 14 OPT for all λ ∈ {11 · · · 5000} by numerically computing the lower
bound for each choice of λ in that range. The computed numerical values of our lower bound are listed in
Table 1 for various choices of λ.
3.2 Large λ
We now prove the second part of Theorem 1, i.e., E[RSOP] ≥ 13.52 OPT for all λ > 5000.
Recall that E[RSOP] ≥ E[Sλλ Z ] OPT by Lemma 3. Also recall that Sλλ and Z are negatively correlated,
thus E[Sλλ ] E[Z ] does not yield a lower bound on E[
Sλ
λ Z ]. Nevertheless, the correlation decreases as λ
increases which suggests that for sufficiently large λ we can separate the two terms. In other words, when
λ is large (i.e., λ > 5000), the two random variables Sλλ and Z are almost independent and so the expected
value of their product is very close to the product of their expected values. Also for a large λ the value of
Sλ
λ is very close to
1
2 so E[
Sλ
λ Z ] is close to
1
2 E[Z ]. We formalize this argument in the following lemma.
Lemma 8. For any α ∈ [0, 1]:
E
[
Sλ
λ
Z
]
≥ α
(
E
[
Z
]
−Pr
[
E{λ}α
])
(18)
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Proof.
E
[
Sλ
λ
Z
]
= Ê
[
Sλ
λ
Z
∣∣∣∣ E{λ}α ]+ Ê [Sλλ Z
∣∣∣∣ E{λ}α ]
≥ α Ê
[
Z
∣∣∣ E{λ}α ] because Sλλ > α conditioned on E{λ}α
= α
(
E
[
Z
]
− Ê
[
Z
∣∣∣ E{λ}α ])
≥ α
(
E
[
Z
]
−Pr
[
E{λ}α
])
because Z ≤ 1 by its definition, i.e., equation (5).
Recall that we can compute an upper bound on Pr[E{λ}α ] using Lemma 2. Also observe that, for any
fixed α ∈ (0, 0.5), Pr[E{λ}α ] approaches 0 exponentially fast as a function of λ as λ→∞. The only remaining
task is to compute a good lower bound on E[Z ].
Lemma 9. E[Z ] ≥ 0.61.
Proof. Let ` = 60000, m = 100, and αi = 0.5 +
i
m+1 for each i ∈ [m]. By applying Lemma 4 and plugging
X = 1 we get
E [Z ] ≥
m∑
i=1
(
1
αi
− 1
αi+1
)
Pr
[Eαi]
≥
m∑
i=1
(
1
αi
− 1
αi+1
)
Pr
[
E{1···`}αi
]
Pr
[
E{`+1···∞}αi
]
by Lemma 1
We then use Lemma 7 to compute Pr[E{1···`}αi ], and use Lemma 6 with `′ = 100000 to compute a lower
bound on Pr[E{`+1···∞}αi ]; by substituting the computed numerical values in the above inequality we get
E[Z ] ≥ 0.61.
It is worth mentioning that by using a similar method we have computed an upper bound of E[Z ] ≤ 0.63
which indicates that our analysis is almost tight. 5
Proof of Theorem 1 for large λ (i.e., λ > 5000). Let α = 0.48. Then
E [RSOP] ≥ E
[
Sλ
λ
Z
]
OPT by Lemma 3
≥ α
(
E
[
Z
]
−Pr
[
E{λ}α
])
OPT by Lemma 8.
Using Lemma 2 we get Pr[E{λ}α ] ≤ 0.0183 for all λ > 5000; furthermore E[Z ] ≥ 0.61 by Lemma 9; substi-
tuting them in the above inequality we get E[RSOP] ≥ 0.284 which is equivalent to a competitive ratio of
3.52.
4 The Exhaustive Search Lower-Bound
In this section we propose an exhaustive search approach which yields an improved lower bound for RSOP
for small choices of λ (i.e., λ ≤ 10). The following theorem summarizes the main result of this section.
Theorem 2. E[RSOP] ≥ 14.68 OPT for λ ≥ 2 and E[RSOP] ≥ 14 OPT for λ ≥ 6. Table 2 lists the actual
lower bounds obtained for various choices of λ.
5Note that 1− 1/e ' 0.6321 which is slightly greater that the upper bound of E[Z ] ≤ 0.63.
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The basic lower bound of E[RSOP] ≥ E[Sλλ Z ] OPT which we used in Section 3 does not yield a good
enough bound when λ is small, mainly because
(I) Sλλ and Z are negatively correlated and their correlation is much stronger when λ is small, also
(II) the highest bid is always in B, so E[Sλλ ] approaches
1
4 as λ goes down to 2.
Therefore, for λ = 2, E[Sλλ Z ] < E[
Sλ
λ ] E[Z ] < 0.25 × 0.63 ≈ 16.55 . In fact, the lower bounds of Table 1 are
quite close to the exact value of E[Sλλ Z ], which suggests for small values of λ we need a different approach.
We now provide a high level description of the approach of this section. Without loss of generality we
assume OPT = 1. In addition to fixing the index of the optimal price, λ, we fix the index of the second
optimal price of a higher index, λ′, and also fix its corresponding revenue, OPT′, i.e.,
λ′ ∈ arg maxj>λ jvj (19)
OPT′ = max
j>λ
jvj (20)
We then try all possible values for OPT′ and v1, . . . , vd (for an appropriate choice of d), and apply the
techniques from Section 3 to the remaining bids; however instead of fixing the exact value of each bid and
of OPT′ — which would require checking infinitely many instances — we restrict each bid and OPT′ to an
interval, i.e., OPT′ ∈ [OPT′,OPT′] and vj ∈ [vj , vj ] for every j ∈ [d]. We then try various configurations of
such intervals to cover all possible scenarios. For each configuration we compute a lower bound on E[RSOP]
for each λ′ ≤ 5000 as a function of both λ and λ′, and another lower bound as a function of only λ assuming
a reasonably large λ′ (e.g., λ′ > 5000). We then take the minimum lower bound among all configurations
and all λ′ to obtain a global lower bound on E[RSOP] for each λ ∈ {2 · · · 10}; the computed lower bounds
are listed in Section 4.
Lemma 10. Let RSOPMinExpect(λ, {[vj , vj ]}j∈[d], [OPT′,OPT
′
]) denote the minimum expected revenue
of E[RSOP] over all instances where OPT′ ∈ [OPT′,OPT′], and vj ∈ [vj , vj ] for all j ∈ [d] and given that
λ is the index of the optimal price. Then for any θ, θ′ ∈ N,
E [RSOP] ≥ min
(i1,...,id)∈[θ]d
i′∈[θ′]
RSOPMinExpect
(
λ,
{[
ij − 1
θ
· 1
j
,
ij
θ
· 1
j
]}
j∈[d]
,
[
i′ − 1
θ′
,
i′
θ′
])
. (21)
Proof. The claim follows because the minimum is taken over all possible combinations of intervals and that
any bid vector is covered by at least one of the combinations.
Note that some combinations of intervals in (21) might be inconsistent/infeasible; for example it is
infeasible to have both [v2, v2] = [
0
10 ,
1
10 ] and [v3, v3] = [
4
15 ,
5
15 ] because that would imply v3 > v2; we define
RSOPMinExpect to be ∞ if a configuration of intervals is infeasible.
Computing a lower bound on RSOPMinExpect. In the rest of this section we show how to compute
a lower bound on E[RSOP] given the assumption that OPT′ ∈ [OPT′,OPT′] and vj ∈ {[vj , vj ]} for all
j ∈ [d], where these intervals are specified exogenously. The high level idea is to enumerate all possible
partitions of the first d bids, define an event for each such partition and decompose E[RSOP] over those
events, and compute a lower bound conditioned on each such event.
We start with a few definitions. For every T ⊂ [d], we define the following event
AT =
{
A ∩ {1 · · · d} = T
}
(22)
Intuitively, AT is the event that, among the first d bids, the subset of bids that fall in A is exactly T.
Observe that under the event AT, both Sj and Zj are constants (for every j ∈ [d]); we will denote those
constants respectively by
sTj = (Sj | AT) = |{1 · · · j} ∩ T| (23)
zTj = (Zj | AT) =
|{1 · · · j} \ T|
|{1 · · · j} ∩ T| (24)
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Our approach is to decompose E[RSOP] over the set of disjoint events {AT}T⊆{2···d} and then decompose
Ê[RSOP | AT] further over the set of disjoint events {E{d+1···∞}(αi−1,αi] }i∈[m] for some choice of 0.5 < α1 < · · · <
αm < 1 (the second decomposition is similar to Section 3); formally,
E [RSOP] =
∑
T⊆{2···d}
m∑
i=1
Ê
[
RSOP
∣∣∣ AT ∩ E{d+1···∞}(αi−1,αi] ] (25)
Next we show how to compute a lower bound on Ê[RSOP | AT ∩ E{d+1···∞}(αi−1,αi] ] that does not depend on
the exact value of the bids.
Lemma 11. For any d ≥ 2, any T ⊆ {2 · · · d}, and any 0.5 < α′ < α ≤ 1,
Ê
[
RSOP
∣∣∣ AT ∩ E{d+1···∞}(α′,α] ] ≥ Ê [max(rT, Sλ′λ′ OPT′
)
ρTα
∣∣∣∣ AT ∩ E{d+1···∞}(α′,α] ] (26)
where rT and ρTα are constants defined as
rT = max
j∈[d]
sTj vj , (27)
A
T
=
{
j ∈ T ∣∣ sTj vj ≥ rT} , (28)
ρTα =
min
{
zTj
∣∣∣ j ∈ AT} if rT > αOPT′
min
({
zTj
∣∣∣ j ∈ AT} , 1−αα ) otherwise . (29)
Proof. Let vλA be the optimal price for A which RSOP offers to bidders in B; observe that
RSOP ≥ (λA − SλA)vλA = SλAvλAZλA
Under event AT ∩ E{d+1···∞}(α′,α] , we show that SλAvλA ≥ max
(
rT, Sλ′λ′ OPT
′
)
and ZλA ≥ ρTα , which combined
with the above inequality imply the statement of the lemma.
• SλAvλA ≥ max
(
rT, Sλ′λ′ OPT
′
)
. Notice that SλAvλA is the optimal revenue of A which must be at
least rT; furthermore, the optimal revenue of A is no less than the revenue of selling to A at price vλ′
which is at least Sλ′λ′ OPT
′.
• ZλA ≥ ρTα . The inequality follows immediately by considering the following two possibilities:
(I) λA ≤ d. In this case λA must be in AT, because for any j ∈ {1 · · · d} \ AT, selling to A at price
vj generates a revenue which is less than r
T, therefore vj cannot be the optimal price for A.
(II) λA > d. First we claim that this case cannot happen if r
T > αOPT
′
, because otherwise the
revenue of selling to A at price vλA is less than r
T which contradicts its optimality. 6
If indeed λA > d, then ZλA ≥ 1−αα under event E{d+1···∞}(α′,α] .
Lemma 12. For any increasing sequence α1, . . . , αm ∈ (0.5, 1) the following inequality holds (assume
αm+1 = 1).
E [RSOP] ≥
∑
T⊆{2···d}
m∑
i=1
(
ρTαi − ρTαi+1
)
Ê
[
max
(
rT,
Sλ′
λ′
OPT′
) ∣∣∣∣ AT ∩ E{d+1···∞}αi ] (30)
6The revenue of selling to A at price vλA is SλAvλA which is at most αλAvλA = αOPT
′ under event E{d+1···∞}
(α′,α] .
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Proof. The claim follows by applying Lemma 11 to equation (25), then decomposing each event E{d+1···∞}(αi−1,αi]
as E{d+1···∞}αi \ E{d+1···∞}αi−1 and applying Proposition 1, and then rearranging the terms.
Next we sketch the proof of the main theorem of this section.
Proof of Theorem 2. We use Lemma 10 with d = 11, θ = 3 and θ′ = 100 together with Lemma 12 with
m = 100 and αi = 0.5 +
i
m+1 for each i ∈ [m]. To compute an accurate approximation (lower bound)
on each term Ê[max
(
rT, Sλ′λ′ OPT
′
)
| AT ∩ E{d+1···∞}αi ], we use a combination of dynamic programming
and tail bounds similar to those of Lemma 5, Lemma 6, Lemma 7, Lemma 8, and Lemma 9 (observe
that Sλ′ is the only random variable in this term). However doing so naively requires computing a lower
bound on as many as θd−1θ′2d−1m such terms.7 Instead, we pre-compute Ê[max(c,Sλ′c′) | {Sd = a} ∩
E{d+1···∞}α ] for all c, c′ ∈ { 0θ′ , . . . , θ
′
θ′ }, all a ∈ {0 · · · d}, and all α ∈ {α1, . . . , αm}; and then we approximate
Ê[max
(
rT, Sλ′λ′ OPT
′
)
| AT ∩ E{d+1···∞}αi ] with Ê[max(c,Sλ′c′) | {Sd = a} ∩ E{d+1···∞}α ] where c, c′ are the
result of rounding rT and OPT
′
λ′ down to the nearest integer multiples of
1
θ′ respectively and a = |T| and
α = αi.
8 Notice that we only need to pre-compute (θ′ + 1)2dm. Table 2 lists the lower bound obtained
for each λ ∈ {1 · · · 10}. As a last note, we should mention that we refine each configuration of intervals by
cutting off infeasible regions of each interval prior to any further computation9.
5 An Upper Bound on The Performance of RSOP
It has been previously shown that there exist instances of bids for which E[RSOP] is as low as 14 OPT (e.g.,
Feige et al. [2005], Goldberg and Hartline [2001]). However, all such instances have λ = 2. That raises the
question of whether the performance of RSOP approaches optimality asymptotically as λ → ∞. In this
section, we exhibit a family of instances for which E[RSOP] is no more than 12.65 OPT as λ → ∞, which
proves that the asymptotic competitive ratio of RSOP is no better than 2.65.
Theorem 3. For any λ ≥ 2 there exists an input instance where there are λ bids above or equal to the
optimal sale price and such that E[RSOP] < 12.65 OPT.
Next, we define a family of instances which are used in the proof of the above theorem.
Definition 3 (Equal Revenue Instance). An instance of bids is called an equal revenue instance if choosing
any of the bids as the sale price yields the same revenue. The equal revenue instance with n non-zero distinct
bids is unique (up to scaling) and given by the bid vector q(n) = (q
(n)
1 , q
(n)
2 , . . .), where
q
(n)
j =
{
1
j j ≤ n
0 otherwise
Proposition 2. For any equal revenue instance, RSOP offers the worst price to each of the sets A and B.
In other words, the optimal price of each set generates the least revenue when offered to the opposite set (i.e.,
less revenue than offering any of the other non-zero bids as the sale price).
Proof. It follows immediately from the fact that offering any of the bids as the sale price for both sets
generates a total revenue that is equal to OPT. So the price that generates highest revenue for A also
generates lowest revenue for B and vice versa.
Proposition 2 suggests that, for any given λ, an equal revenue instance might actually be the worst case
instance for RSOP among all instances with the same λ; however based on computer simulation that seems
not to be true at least for small values of λ.
7Because there are θd−1θ′ possible combinations of intervals in (21) and 2d−1 events of the form AT and m events of the
form E{d+1···∞}αi .
8It is easy to see that Ê[max(c,
Sλ′
λ′ c
′) | AT ∩ E{d+1···∞}α ] = Ê[max(c, Sλ′λ′ c′) | {Sd = |T|} ∩ E
{d+1···∞}
α ].
9For example if vj < vj+1, we set vj ← vj+1.
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To prove Theorem 3, we need to show the expected revenue of RSOP is no more that 12.65 OPT for any
equal revenue instance with distinct bids. However a direct analysis of the performance of RSOP for all such
instances is not easy. Instead we define a modified variant of RSOP whose performance is easy to analyze,
and whose revenue is close to the revenue of RSOP (e.g., asymptotically equal as λ→∞).
Definition 4 (RSOP∗). The modified random sampling optimal price auction behaves exactly the same way
as RSOP (see Definition 1), except if all of the non-zero bids fall in the same set, it offers them the lowest
non-zero bid as the sale price (instead of 0) .
Note that RSOP∗ is not a truthful auction, however it is only used to aid the analysis. Next we show
that the revenue of RSOP is asymptotically equal to the revenue of RSOP∗.
Lemma 13. E[RSOP] ≤ E[RSOP∗] ≤ E[RSOP] + ( 12 )
n−1
OPT, with the second inequality being met with
equality for equal revenue instances.
Proof. Recall that RSOP∗ behaves exactly like RSOP except when all the n bids fall in the same set which
happens with probability ( 12 )
n−1
, in which case RSOP∗ still generates a revenue of at most OPT (exactly
OPT if it is an equal revenue instance), while RSOP generates zero revenue.
Lemma 14. E[RSOP∗(q(n))] is a decreasing function of n.
Proof. Let Rev(v,A, p) and Rev(v,B, p) denote the revenue obtained by offering price p to bidders respec-
tively in A and B with the vector of bids v. Also let Rev∗(v,A) and Rev∗(v,B) denote the revenue RSOP∗
obtains respectively from each of A and B under partition (A,B). Observe that Rev∗(v,A) = 0, because
the price that is offered to A is always 1. So it is enough to show that E[Rev∗(q(n),B)] is a decreasing
function of n.
Let v = q(n) and v′ = q(n−1). We now prove that Rev∗(v,B) ≤ Rev∗(v′,B) which implies the claim
of the lemma. Let vλA and v
′
λ′A
denote the prices offered to B by RSOP∗ respectively on v and v′, i.e.,
λA ∈ arg maxj∈ARev(v,A, vj), and λ′A ∈ arg maxj∈ARev(v′,A, v′j). There are four possible scenarios:
(I) n ∈ A and {1 · · ·n− 1} ⊂ B. In this case Rev∗(v,B) = 1− 1n < 1 = Rev∗(v′,B).10
(II) n ∈ A and {1 · · ·n− 1} 6⊂ B. In this case either
(a) λA = λ
′
A < n and so Rev
∗(v,B) = Rev∗(v′,B), or
(b) λA < λ
′
A = n, but that means Rev(v,A, vλA) ≥ Rev(v′,A, v′λ′A), therefore it must be Rev
∗(v,B) =
Rev(v,B, vλA) ≤ Rev(v′,B, v′λ′A) = Rev
∗(v′,B). 11
(III) n ∈ B and {1 · · ·n− 1} ⊂ B. In this case Rev∗(v,B) = Rev∗(v′,B) = 1.
(IV) n ∈ B and {1 · · ·n− 1} 6⊂ B. In this case λA = λ′A < n and vλA > vn so vn does not affect the
revenue, therefore Rev∗(v,B) = Rev∗(v′,B).
The following is obtained by direct calculation using a computer.
Proposition 3. E[RSOP∗(q(400))] = 0.377208± 10−6.
We now prove the main theorem of this section.
10Recall that OPT(q(n)) = 1.
11That is because both v and v′ are equal revenue instances, therefore Rev(v,B, vλA )+ Rev(v,A, vλA ) = Rev(v
′,B, v′
λ′
A
)+
Rev(v′,A, v′
λ′
A
) = 1.
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Proof of Theorem 3. To prove the theorem for any λ we exhibit a bid vector v with λ bids above the optimal
sale price such that E[RSOP(v)] < 12.65 OPT(v). Let n = max(λ, 400), then
E
[
RSOP(q(n))
]
≤ E
[
RSOP∗(q(n))
]
by Lemma 13
≤ E
[
RSOP∗(q(400))
]
by Lemma 14
< 0.377209 by Proposition 3
<
1
2.65
OPT(q(n)) because OPT(q(n)) = 1
Observe that the optimal sale price for q(n) is not unique. Let v be the same as q(n) everywhere except
vλ = q
(n)
λ +  for a small  ∈ (0, 1λ2 ). Observe that vλ is now the unique optimal sale price for v. It is easy to
see that lim→0 E[RSOP(v)] = E[RSOP(q(n))] and lim→0 OPT(v) = OPT(q(n)) = 1, so for a small enough
, we get E[RSOP(v)] < 12.65 OPT(v) which completes the proof.
6 A Combinatorial Lower Bound
In this section we present a combinatorial approach for obtaining a lower bound on the expected revenue
of RSOP for equal revenue instance where each non-zero bid is either 1, or h (for some fixed h ∈ N). We
hope the ideas we present in the section help develop a more general combinatorial approach in the future
for proving lower bounds on mechanisms based on random sampling.
Observe that in an equal revenue instance where non-zero bids are either h or 1, if there are k bids of
value h, there must be k(h−1) bids of vale 1. Throughout the rest of this section we assume h is an implicit
constant. The following theorem summarizes the main result of this section.
Theorem 4. For any equal revenue instance where each non-zero bid is either h or 1,
E [RSOP] ≥
(
1
2
+
1
2h
− 1
2kh−1
)
OPT (31)
where k is the number of bids of value h.
Observe that in the above theorem the worst case of the lower bound is when k = 1 and h = 2 for which
the lower bound becomes OPT /4. Notice that the lower bound approaches OPT /2 quickly as either k or h
increases.
Definition 5. Q(k) denotes the multi-set of bid corresponding to an equal revenue instance with k bids of
value h and k(h− 1) bids of value 1.
For the rest of this section we assume that A and B are multi-sets containing the actual bids in each side
of the partition, as opposed to the previous sections where we assumed A and B contained the indices of
those bids. Furthermore, for any multi-set of bids such as I, we use the notation E[RSOP(I)], E[RSOP∗(I)]
and OPT(I) to denote the respective quantity being computed on bids explicitly specified by I. We also
make no assumption about which of A or B gets the highest bid, unless explicitly stated otherwise.
We start by proving a lower bound on the expected revenue of RSOP∗ (see Definition 4) on equal revenue
instances where each non-zero bid is either h or 1. We then extend the lower bound to RSOP. Recall that
RSOP∗ behaves exactly the same way as RSOP, except if all non-zero bids fall in the same set, RSOP∗ offers
them the lowest non-zero bid as the sale price (instead of 0).
Lemma 15. For any k ∈ N,
E
[
RSOP∗(Q(k))
]
≥ k(h+ 1)
2
=
1
2
OPT(Q(k)) +
k
2
. (32)
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Proof. We prove the claim by induction on k.
We first prove the base case which is k = 1. The single bid of value h is the highest bid. Without loss of
generality assume that the h bid is in B. Observe that the optimal price of B is h which is also the price
offered to A, so no revenue is obtained from A. Furthermore the optimal price of A is 1 which is also the
price offered to B. Each bid of value 1 falls in B with probability 1/2, so E[RSOP∗(Q(1))] = 1 + h−12 which
proves the base of the induction.
We now prove the induction step. For any two multi-sets of bids such as T and U, let Rev∗(T,U) denote
the revenue obtained from T by computing the optimal sale price for U (let the optimal price be 1 if U = ∅)
and offering that price to T; also let Rev(T, p) denote the revenue obtained by offering price p to T. Let
(A,B) be a random partition of Q(1), and let (A′,B′) be a random partition of Q(k−1). Observe that
(A ∪A′,B ∪B′) is a random partition of Q(k). The induction step follows from the following inequities.
E
[
RSOP∗(Q(k))
]
= E [Rev∗(A ∪A′,B ∪B′) + Rev∗(B ∪B′,A ∪A′)]
≥ E [Rev∗(A,B) + Rev∗(A′,B′) + Rev∗(B,A) + Rev∗(B′,A′)] to be proven
= E
[
RSOP∗(Q(1))
]
+ E
[
RSOP∗(Q(k−1))
]
≥ h+ 1
2
+
(k − 1)(h+ 1)
2
>
k(h+ 1)
2
by the induction hypothesis
We shall prove Rev∗(B∪B′,A∪A′) > Rev∗(B,A)+Rev∗(B′,A′) and by symmetry we can argue Rev∗(A∪
A′,B ∪B′) > Rev∗(A,B) + Rev∗(A′,B′) which completes the proof. Let p, p′ and p′′ denote the optimal
price of A, A′ and A ∪ A′ respectively as computed by RSOP∗ (i.e., the optimal price for an empty set
would be 1). We argue that
Rev∗(B ∪B′,A ∪A′) = Rev(B, p′′) + Rev(B′, p′′)
≥ Rev(B, p) + Rev(B′, p′) explained below
= Rev∗(B,A) + Rev∗(B′, A′).
Observe that both A ∪ B and A′ ∪ B′ are equal revenue instances and by Proposition 2 in any equal
revenue instance the price that is optimal for one side generates the least revenue for the opposite side so
Rev(B, p′′) ≥ Rev(B, p) and Rev(B′, p′′) ≥ Rev(B′, p′).
Proof of Theorem 4. Recall that the only situation where RSOP∗ and RSOP behave differently is when
either A or B is empty which happens with probability 1/2kh−1, therefore
E
[
RSOP(Q(k))
]
= E
[
RSOP∗(Q(k))
]
− 1
2kh−1
OPT
≥ k(h+ 1)
2
− 1
2kh−1
OPT by Lemma 15
=
(
1
2
+
1
2h
− 1
2kh−1
)
OPT because OPT = kh
That completes the proof.
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A Results
λ E[RSOP]/OPT Competitive-Ratio
2 0.125148 7.99
3 0.166930 5.99
4 0.192439 5.20
5 0.209222 4.78
6 0.221407 4.52
7 0.230605 4.34
8 0.237862 4.20
9 0.243764 4.10
10 0.248647 4.02
11 0.252774 3.96
15 0.264398 3.78
20 0.273005 3.66
30 0.282297 3.54
50 0.290384 3.44
100 0.296993 3.37
200 0.300549 3.33
300 0.301784 3.31
500 0.302792 3.30
1000 0.303560 3.29
1500 0.303818 3.29
2000 0.303949 3.29
Table 1: Computed numerical values for the basic lower-bound of E[RSOP] ≥ E[Sλλ Z ] OPT.
λ E[RSOP]/OPT Competitive-Ratio
2 0.2138 4.68
3 0.2178 4.59
4 0.238 4.20
5 0.243 4.11
6 0.2503 3.99
7 0.2545 3.93
8 0.2602 3.84
9 0.2627 3.81
10 0.2669 3.75
Table 2: Computed numerical values for the exhaustive-search lower-bound
B Proofs
Theorem 5 (Chernoff-Hoeffding1963). For (i.i.d.) random variables X1,X2, . . . ,X` ∈ {0, 1} with E[Xi] = p,
the following inequality holds for all ε ∈ (0, 1− p):
Pr
[
1
`
∑
Xi ≥ p+ ε
]
≤
((
p
p+ ε
)p+ε(
1− p
1− p− ε
)1−p−ε)`
(33)
Lemma (2). For any α ∈ (0, 1) and j ∈ N,
if α ≥ 0.5, then Pr
[
E{j}α
]
≥ 1− (rα)j , where rα = 1
2αα(1− α)1−α
if α ≤ 0.5− 1/j, then Pr
[
E{j}α
]
≤ (r(α+1/j))j−1 where rα is the same as above.
Proof. Let Aj be an indicator random variable which is 1 if j ∈ A, and 0 otherwise.
The first inequality of the lemma follows immediately from Theorem 5 by setting Xj = Aj , ` = j, p = 0.5,
and ε = α − 0.5 which yields an upper bound on Pr[E{j}α ] and thus a lower bound on Pr[E{j}α ]. Note that
A1 = 0 with probability 1, however that only decreases the probability on the left hand side of (33) so it
still holds.
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To prove the second inequality, we proceed as follows.
Pr
[
E{j}α
]
= Pr
[
Sj
j
≤ α
]
= Pr
[∑j
k=1 Ak
j
> 1− α
]
= Pr
[∑j
k=2 Ak
j
> 1− α− 1
j
]
because A1 = 1 always.
≤ Pr
[∑j
k=2 Ak
j − 1 > 1− α−
1
j
]
.
The second inequality of the lemma now follows immediately from Theorem 5 by setting Xj = Aj−1, ` = j−1,
p = 0.5, and  = 0.5− α− 1j . Note that r1−α− 1j = rα+ 1j .
Theorem 6 (Fortuin, Kasteleyn, and Ginibre [1971]). Let L be a finite distributive lattice, and µ : L→ R+
be a function that satisfies
µ(x ∧ y)µ(x ∨ y) ≥ µ(x)µ(y), for all x, y ∈ L. (34)
Then for any two functions f, g : L→ R+ which are either both increasing, or both decreasing, the following
inequality holds. (∑
x∈L
f(x)g(x)µ(x)
)(∑
x∈L
µ(x)
)
≥
(∑
x∈L
f(x)µ(x)
)(∑
x∈L
g(x)µ(x)
)
(35)
Lemma (1). For any T,T′ ⊂ N and α ∈ [0, 1], the two events ETα and ET
′
α are positively correlated, i.e.,
Pr[ETα ∩ ET
′
α ] ≥ Pr[ETα ] Pr[ET
′
α ].
Proof. For every n ∈ N, define Tn = T ∩ {1 · · ·n}; similarly define T′n, An, Bn, etc.
We start by proving Pr[ETnα ∩ ET
′
n
α ] ≥ Pr[ETnα ] Pr[ET
′
n
α ] for every n ∈ N. Let Ln be a distributive
lattice whose elements are the subsets of {2 · · ·n} and whose meet/join operators correspond to taking
intersection/union. For all A ∈ Ln let µ(A) = 1/2n−1. Define ETnα (A) to be an indicator function which is
defined for each A ∈ Ln as
ETnα (A) =
{
1 if |A ∩ {1 · · · j}| ≤ αj for all j ∈ Tn
0 otherwise
.
By invoking Theorem 6 on lattice Ln and substituting f(x) and g(x) with ETnα (A) and ET
′
n
α (A) respectively
we get the following inequality.
 ∑
A⊆{2···n}
ETnα (A)ET
′
n
α (A)
2n−1
 ≥
 ∑
A⊆{2···n}
ETnα (A)
2n−1
 ∑
A⊆{2···n}
ET′nα (A)
2n−1

Observe that the left hand side of the above inequality is exactly EA[ETnα (A)ET
′
n
α (A)] = Pr[ETnα ∩ ET
′
n
α ]
while its right hand side is exactly EA[ETnα (A)] EA[ET
′
n
α (A)] = Pr[ETnα ] Pr[ET
′
n
α ], so we have proved that
Pr[ETnα ∩ ET
′
n
α ] ≥ Pr[ETnα ] Pr[ET
′
n
α ] for every n ∈ N.
We now prove the infinite case. For every n ∈ N, define `n = Pr[ETnα ∩ ET
′
n
α ], rn = Pr[ETnα ] Pr[ET
′
n
α ],
and dn = `n − rn. Observe that dn is an infinite sequence which is bounded in [0, 1], so by invoking
BolzanoWeierstrass theorem we argue that it has an infinite converging subsequence, i.e., there exists an
infinite sequence of indices n1 < n2 < · · · and d∗ ∈ [0, 1] such that limj→∞ dnj = d∗. On the other hand
both `nj and rnj are decreasing sequences which are bounded below by 0 so they both converge, therefore
Pr
[
ETα ∩ ET
′
α
]
−Pr
[
ETα
]
Pr
[
ET′α
]
= lim
j→∞
`nj − lim
j→∞
rnj = lim
j→∞
dnj = d
∗ ≥ 0
which proves the claim of the lemma.
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